Establishing a Capital Defense Unit in Virginia:
A Proposal to Increase the Quality of
Representation for Indigent
Capital Defendants by White, Jeremy P.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 5
Spring 3-1-2001
Establishing a Capital Defense Unit in Virginia: A
Proposal to Increase the Quality of Representation
for Indigent Capital Defendants
Jeremy P. White
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeremy P. White, Establishing a Capital Defense Unit in Virginia: A Proposal to Increase the Quality of Representation for Indigent Capital
Defendants, 13 Cap. DEF J. 323 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol13/iss2/5
Establishing a Capital Defense Unit in Virginia:





A capital defendant who seeks reversal of a conviction or sentence on
appeal because of defense attorney's mistakes faces a formidable foe. The
defendant must show that the attorney's deficient performance rendered the
trial unfair and denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.1 The very claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
elicits a mental image of the youthful shepherd, David, opposing the giant,
Goliath! Absent his confidence in God, David might have engaged a more
manageable opponent. Similarly, a capital defendant should avoid the giant
of a post-trial ineffective assistance of counsel claim and fight a less sizeable
adversary at trial.
In Strickland v. Washington,3 the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished the high standard that a defendant must meet in order to overturn a
sentence or conviction due to the deficient performance of his counsel."
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
MidAmerica Nazarene University. Thanks first and foremost to my LORD and Savior Jesus
Christ who daily strengthens and guides me. Thank you to Lorena, my Proverbs 31 wife,
and our family.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence"); McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating "if the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent
counsel"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1932) (holding that Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process is violated if appointed counsel does not have adequate time to prepare,
investigate, and become acquainted with the facts of the case).
2. 1 Samuel 17:40-50.
3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that defendant must
show counsels deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
323
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The standard requires the defendant to show that his counsel made "errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." The defendant must also establish
that counsel's errors "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable."6 The reliability prong directs the
appellate court to look at the record of the completed trial or sentencing
proceeding and determine whether a proceeding, absent the attorney's error,
would create a reasonable probability of a different outcome.7 Justice
Marshall dissented from the use of the reliability prong and argued that
"[t]he difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the
possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the
record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel."'
defense before a sentence or conviction will be overturned). In explaining how to assess
deficient attorney performance, the United States Supreme Court directed lower courts to
"indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that...
the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (quoting Michel
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
5. Id. at 687 (requiring the defendant to demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness"). 'The proper measure of attorney perfor-
mance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing pro Fessional norms." Id. at 688.
6. Id. at 687. The Court requires both showings before the court can determine 'that
the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.* Id.
7. Id. at 694. For examples of the types of conduct that have passed the Strickland test
of ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases see William S. Geimer, A Decade of
Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91, 155-161 (1995) (discussing the reduced impact of the guarantee
that all individuals, regardless of economic status, enjoy an adequate defense because of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland). An attorney representing a capital
defendant had his license to practice law revoked for the second time prior to trial, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the attorney's performance
was not ineffective under Strickland because the trial occurred prior to the effective date of
the suspension. Id. at 155-56 (citing McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 518, 533-39 (4th Cir.
1990)). Another attorney who failed to call a key witness in a capital trial because the
attorney misunderstood state law was not ineffective under the Strickland standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 158 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 818-20 (5th
Cir. 1993)); see also Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Jus" The Rationing and Denial of
Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783
(1997) (providing examples of atrocious behavior by attorneys that courts found did not
offend die Sixth A menment guarantee to effective assistance of counsel). An attorney who
slept during nearly the entire trial was not ineffective under the Strickland standard. Id. at
829. The trial judge said, "the Constitution doesn't say the lawyer has to be awake." Id.
8. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, the capital defendant's most effective means of avoiding the
morass of after-the-fact determinations of counsel's performance lies in an
adequately conducted defense at trial and sentencing.
Due to the significant burdens placed upon defendants who chal-
lenge the adequacy of trial counsel, the reluctance of appellate
courts to grant relief based on unfairness in jury selection, and the
limits placed on federal courts to review habeas corpus claims of
constitutional error, the trial of capital defendants has become
"virtually the whole ball game." '
Virginia's record corroborates the assertion that the capital trial constitutes
"the whole ball game," because a 1995 study found that "[o]f 128 death
sentences imposed since 1977, the Virginia Supreme Court has reversed
eleven, or about eight percent of the cases, compared with a national average
of forty percent."" Defendants in Virginia have only one-fifth of the chance
of defendants nationally to have the state's highest court find error sufficient
to warrant a reversal of the death penalty.11
In an effort to eliminate defendants' post-trial ineffective assistance of
counsel claims and provide the best opportunity for capital defendants to
enjoy a fair trial, this artide explores the possibility of forming the statewide
Virginia Capital Defense Unit ("the VCDU"). The VCDU would provide
the primary source of trial representation for indigent capital defendants in
the Commonwealth. The VCDU would enhance the quality of representa-
tion for indigent capital defendants, ensure the competence of appointed
attorneys, and keep accurate, current records of capital cases in Virginia to
facilitate the continuous assessment and improvement of capital representa-
9. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFOR-
MANCE OF COUNSELIN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 1.1 commentary (1989) (quoting
William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreatfrom
its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 737, 779 (1985) (arguing that the United
States Supreme Court's decisions have not held true to the requirement initially articulated
that death penalty defendants must receive heightened due process).
10. Frank Green, Scathing ACLU Report Attacks Law, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr.
8, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 5034839 (citing a study by Professor James S. Liebman
of Columbia Law School); see also State by State Comparison (visited Jan. 18, 2001) < http://
www.truthinjustice.org/statebystatechart.htm> (providing a comparison of individual
states' and federal circuits' reversal rates of death sentences as found in the Liebman study).
From 1996 through February 2001, the Supreme Court of Virginia overturned two
death sentences, thus raising the total number from 11 to 13. See Yarbrough v. Common-
wealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 617 (Va. 1999) (holding that the case be reversed and remanded for
a new sentencing proceeding); Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 447 (Va. 1999)
(same).
11. Green, supra note 10, at Al.
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tion. This article compares capital trial divisions and capital defense counsel
qualifications in several states. The article then extracts positive characteris-
tics of the various capital trial divisions and proposes a structure for the
VCDU to achieve autonomy, efficient administration, and a workable
structure to prevent potential conflicts of interest between Virginia's public
defender offices and the VCDU.
IL Alternative Structures and Responsibilities of
State Capital Trial Divisions
Perhaps the most efficient method for exploring the VCDU begins
with a synopsis and critique of several state systems that utilize a statewide
organization or agency to provide representation for indigent capital defen-
dants. This Part discusses the structure of Oklahoma's Capital Trial Divi-
sion, Missouri's Capital Division, Nebraska's Capital Litigation Division,
Maryland's Capital Defense Division, and Kansas's Death Penalty Defense
Unit. In an effort to present information most relevant to Virginia's per-
spective, the following assessment of states begins with the state that has an
execution rate closest to Virginia's and descends to the state furthest from
Virginia's execution rate."2
A. Oklahoma's Capital Trial Division
Oklahoma has a population of 3.5 million and has executed thirty-nine
individuals since 1976.Y Oklahoma established the Capital Trial Division
("the Division") in 1991 to represent indigent capital defendants as an arm
of the Indigent Defense System ("the System")." The Oklahoma Indigent
12. See State Execution Rates (visited Jan. 18, 2001) < http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/percapita.html> (comparing statistics of the individual state's population, the total
number of executions as of December 31,2000, and the rate of executions per 10,000 popula-
tion).
For example, Virginia's population is listed at approximately 7.1 million, with 81
executions since 1976 for an execution rate of 0.114 per 10,000 individuals. Id. Oklahoma's
statistics consist of a population of about 3.5 million, with 39 executions since 1976 for an
execution rate of 0.087 per 10,000 individuals. Id.; see Number of Executions by State Since
1976 (visited Jan. 18, 2001) < http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org /dpicreg.html> (listing
individual states and the respective number of executions within that state since 1976).
Missouri's execution rate was 0.082; Nebraska's execution rate was 0.018; Maryland's
execution rate was 0.006; and Kansas's execution rate was 0. See State Execution Rates, supra.
13. State Execution Rates, supra note 12; see Number ofExecutions by State Since 1976,
supra note 12.
14. Telephone Interview with David Autrey, Attorney, Oklahoma Capital Trial
Division (Jan. 26, 2001); see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, S 1355.6(A) (West Supp. 2001)
(granting responsibility to the Indigent Defense System to defend all indigents in cases
[Vol. 13:2
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Defense System Board ("the Board") governs the System." The governor
appoints five members to the Board for five year terms with the advice and
consent of the state senate.16 The Board appoints an Executive Director of
the System, who possesses a large amount of discretion and power to oper-
ate and manage the System, "to serve at the pleasure of the Board.""'
The Division consists of two separate offices, one located in Tulsa and
the other located in Norman. The offices operate as separate law firms for
conflicts of interest purposes.Is Each office bears the responsibility for
representing defendants prosecuted in counties within a demarcated geo-
graphic area.' Tulsa and Oklahoma counties utilize their respective public
defender offices for the purpose of accepting appointment from the court
to represent indigent capital defendants." The Norman Division office
represents capital defendants in forty-six counties including Oklahoma
County when the public defender has a conflict of interest." The Tulsa
Division office accepts appointments to represent capital defendants in
thirty-one counties including Tulsa County in the event of the public
defender's conflict of interest.' The Division has an internal policy that
each attorney can have no more than four active cases at one time.'
In the event of multiple defendant cases or the need for a local attorney
to assist in representation, the Division contracts with attorneys from the
private bar to represent defendants. Once an attorney from the Division
begins primary representation of an indigent capital defendant, the attorney
may enlist the assistance of private counsel as second chair in the trial.
punishable by incarceration).
15. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 22, 5 1355.1 (West Supp. 2001).
16. Id.
17. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, S 1355.4(C)-(D) (West Su p. 2001) (providing the
Executive Director's duties to maintain a list of attorneys eligible for appointment to capital
cases who meet the qualifications set by the board, set hourly rates for appointed attorneys,
establish maximum caseloads for attorneys employed by the System, reduce caseloads
through reassignment of cases, advise attorneys employed to represent indigent defendants,
approve investigative services for appointed attorneys, and maintain a list of approved
experts).
18. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System 2000 Annual Report (visited Feb. 15, 2001)
<http://www.oklaosf.state.ok.us/- oids/agencyreports.htm>.
19. Telephone Interview with David Autrey, supra note 14.
20. Id.; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. SS 1355.6(E), 1355.7(A) (West Supp. 2001) (delegating
the power to the courts to appoint the attorneys to represent indigent defendants in both
capital and non-capital cases).
21. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System 2000 Annual Report, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Telephone Interview with David Autrey, supra note 14.
2001]
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Appointed lead counsel may not receive compensation of more than $20,000
for a capital case unless the Board and the System's Executive Director
determine that the capital case is an "exceptional one which requires an
extraordinary amount of time to litigate." ' Of the six capital cases that
went to trial from the Norman office in the past fiscal year, the Division
used private co-counsel in three cases.15 The Division maintains a list of the
private attorneys who meet the qualifications for defending a capital case
and contracts directly with those attorneys.'
For the fiscal year 2001, the Norman office had twenty-six pending
capital cases and received twenty-five new capital cases for a total of fifty-
one open capital cases.27 Of the fifty-one cases, six have gone to trial.2,
Three defendants received life without parole, two defendants received life
with parole, and one received the death penalty." These statistics reflect the
activity only for the Norman office. The Division offices do not accumu-
late records of capital cases for Oklahoma and Tulsa county public defender
offices."
B. Missouri's Capital Division of the State Public Defender
Missouri has a population of about-5.6 million and has executed forty-
seven individuals since 1976."1 The Public Defender Commission ("the
Commission") administers the representation of indigent defendants
throughout the state.32  The governor appoints seven members to the
Commission for a term of six years each. " The Commission manages the
State Public Defender system ("the SPD"), selects and removes public
defenders for good cause, makes administrative rules, and assists in assuring
the independence of the state public defender system?' The Commission
appoints a director to the SPD, which is an independent department of the
24. OKLA. STAT. ANN. S 1355.13 (West Supp. 2001).






31. State Execution Rates, supra note 12; see Number of Executions by State Since 1976,
supra note 12.
32. MO. ANN. STAT. S 600.015 (West 1995).
33. Id.
34. Mo. ANN. STAT. S 600.017 (West 1995).
[Vol. 13:2
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judicial branch."5 The capital division falls within the structure as an organ
of the SPD.36
In 1989, the SPD separated into four separate divisions: the trial
division', appellate division, training division, and capital division. 7 The
capital division of the SPD provides representation in capital cases unless a
conflict of interest or a heavy caseload exists then the SPD selects an attor-
ney from the private bar.38 The capital division consists of three offices
located in St. Louis, Kansas City, and Columbia. 9 The division offices in
St. Louis and Kansas City primarily represent defendants from those urban
areas, whereas the Columbia office represents defendants throughout the
remainder of the state.'
When a judge encounters a case in which the prosecutor seeks the death
penalty, the judge must appoint the capital division to represent the indigent
defendant.41 The SPD maintains a list of private attorneys from which the
SPD may select and contract with an attorney to represent the defendant if
the capital division has a multiple defendant case or conflicts of interest.
The SPD has not promulgated official guidelines for private counsel who
represent indigent capital defendants. However, if the SPD lacks familiarity
with an attorney's ability, it will conduct a background inquiry to ensure a
minimum level of experience in homicide defense.42 The SPD rarely calls
upon private attorneys to represent defendants due to conflicts of interest
because in a multi-defendant capital case the three offices can represent one
defendant each and generally only need private counsel if the case involves
more than three defendants.43
The division offices also act as a resource for attorneys representing
indigent capital defendants. The public defender offices and the capital
division offices can access a computer network that-contains training infor-
mation and a motions databank. The shared databank presents a potential
35. MO. ANN. STAT. S 600.019 (West 1995).
36. Telephone Interview with Dan Gralicke, Deputy Director, Missouri State Public
Defender (Jan. 30, 2001).
37. Id.
38. The Spangenberg Research Group, Rates of Compensation for Court-Appointed
Counsel in Capital Cases at Trial: A State-By-State Overview (Apr. 1998) (unpublished
document, on file with The Spangenberg Group).







for conflicts of interest and requires each office to prevent the sharing of
confidential information.
The capital division received an annual appropriation of approximately
$1.3 million for litigation expenses and experts.' The state's
Homicide/Conflicts fund of $2,059,850 supplements the existing budget for
appointment of private counsel and payment of some litigation expenses.4"
The salaries for the attorneys come from a separate appropriation and
starting salaries range from $30,504 to $50,232.' The capital division's
funding may fall short due to the high cost of experts and the nature of
capital cases.' As of January 2001, the capital division had between fifty
and sixty active cases.4
C, Nebraska's Capital Litigation Division of the Nebraska Commission on
Public Advocacy
Nebraska has a population of 1.7 million and has executed three indi-
viduals since 1976. 4' Nebraska's county public defenders providethe pri-
mary representation of capital defendants. The Capital Litigation Division
("the CLD"), as a branch of the Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy
("the Commission"), handles the remaining capital cases.'s County public
defender offices may decline to accept a capital case because of a heavy
caseload or a conflict of interest and choose a private attorney or allow the
CLD to represent the case. The public defender office often selects counsel
from the private bar to represent either a co-defendant or assist as co-coun-
sel. The hourly rate received by private counsel ranges from sixty-five to
eighty-five dollars per hour and remains in the discretion of the trial court."
44. Id.
45. Id.; see Offce of the State Public Defender (visited Jan. 18, 2001) < http://www.
oa.state.mo.us/bp/udget2001/dpdef/index.shtml> (listing the precise budget allocation for
fiscal year 2001).
46. Telephone Interview with Dan Gralicke, supra note 36.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. State Execution Rates, supra note 12; see Number of Executions by State Since 1976,
supra note 12.
50. Telephone Interview with Jerry Soucie, Appellate Division Attorney, Nebraska
Commission on Public Advocacy (an. 30, 2001); see NEB. REV. STAT. 5 29-3929 (2000)
(establishing the responsibility of the chief counsel of the Commission on Public Advocacy
to supervise the operations of the capital litigation division and disburse necessary funds for
operations); NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-3930 (2000) (establishing the capital litigation division
within the Commission to "assist in the defense of capital cases in Nebraska").
51. Telephone Interview with Jerry Soucie, supra note 50.
52. Id.
.330 [Vol. 13:2
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The rate of pay involves negotiation between the attorney and the judge; an
attorney may require a higher hourly rate for a highly publicized and
complex case."
A 6bard of commissioners governs the CLD. The criminal defense
organizations of the state bar nominate the list of individuals for the gover-
nor to consider. The governor approves the nominees for the unpaid
positions as commissioners. The governor cannot remove the commission-
ers at will, but must have cause, such as malfeasance, prior to removal. The
CLD enjoys independence from the governor's office.'
The CLD consists of four attorneys, three support staff, and one
investigator and receives an annual budget of about $560,000."s However,
the state does not pay the CID's entire cost of litigating a capital trial.
Rather, the prosecuting county must reimburse the CLD for one-third of
the cost to defend the case.' The CLD provides strategic advice and
pertinent motions for public defenders and private attorneys, but the CLD
attorneys do not simply hand boilerplate motions to outside attorneys;
instead the CLD attorneys sit down with the private attorneys and discuss
the proper purposes and the appropriate time to file the motions. 7 Al-
though the CLD has separate capital appellate and trial divisions, the divi-
sions effectively function as one system. An appellate division attorney who
has a relatively light capital appeals caseload may defend a capital case at the
trial level and vice versa. s
The debate rages in Nebraska between the public defenders and the
private bar over whether to institute qualifications for attorneys to represent
indigent criminal defendants. 9 A proposed bill includes minimum require-




56. Id.; see NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-3931 (2000) (requiring the county in which the
prosecution of the capital case arose to bear one-third of the Commission's cost of defense
including time of attorneys and staff, expenditures for litigation, and a reasonable amount for
office overhead). This provision may function as a constraint upon an overly zealous
prosecutor because the prosecutor must weigh the fact of the county's limited financial
resources against the desire to pursue the death penalty.
57. Telephone Interview with Jerry Soucie, supra note 50 (commenting that the value
of handing a stack of capital motions to an attorney is relatively small unless accompanied
by instruction as to when to file the motions and why those motions should be filed).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see L.B. 335, 97th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2001) (granting the power to the
2001]
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example, new law school graduates may only represent juvenile cases, an
attorney with two years of experience may represent only the lowest class
of crimes, and an attorney must have five years experience and experience
as co-counsel in a capital case prior representing an indigent capital defen-
dant. 1 Opposition arose because the legislature tied the qualifications to a
funding bill which would reimburse counties for forty percent of their costs
of representing indigent criminal defendants if the county chooses to follow
the standards.'2 The bill pending in the state legislature grants the Commis-
sion a significant amount of discretion to determine attorney eligibility and
qualifications, set compensation rates for salaried public defenders, distribute
overall funding of the indigent defense system, establish maximum case-
loads, award contracts to private counsel, provide support services, and
provide expert witnesses. '
The CLD represents capital defendants at trial in about eight to ten
cases per year and about the same number of cases per year on direct
appeal." Nebraska has between fifty and sixty homicides per year, and the
state charges approximately forty with capital murder.'5 As mentioned
above, county public defenders bear the responsibility for representing
capital defendants, so the CID may handle about twenty of the capital
homicide cases per year.6  The CLD needs another investigator and a
mitigation expert.' The CILD currently employs one investigator for the
entire state of Nebraska, which makes adequate performance of the job
dlifficult simply due to the large geographic area." The lack of a mitigation
expert adds to the list of responsibilities of the investigator. However, the
current number of attorneys sufficiently ensures quality representation for
.defendants because each attorney has a caseload of only five or six cases at
any given time.'
Commission on Public Advocacy to promulgate rules for its organization and adopt guide-
lines for county indigent defense systems which, if followed, will qualify the county for
reimbursement of the cost of indigent defense).
61. Telephone Interview with Jerry Soucie, supra note 50.
62. Id.
63. Neb. L.B. 355 (granting immense control to the Commission on Public Advocacy
over the functioning of the individual county public defender offices).
64. Telephone Interview with Jerry Soucie, supra note 50 (describing the automatic








D. Maryland's Capital Defense Division
Maryland has a population of 5.3 million and has executed three
individuals since 1976.70 In 1971, Maryland formed the Office of Public
Defender. ("the OPD") to provide statewide representation for indigent
criminal defendants." As an agency of Maryland's Executive Branch, the
governor appoints a Board of Trustees ("the Board") that consists of three
members who each serve three-year terms.' The Board appoints a Public
Defender who directs the OPD, the Deputy Public Defender, and one
district public defender for each district of the Maryland District Court
subject to the approval of the Board.". In 1988, the OPD created the Mary-
land Capital Defense Division ("the Division") to provide statewide repre-
sentation for indigent capital defendants.74 The Division retains independ-
ent decision-makinf power and discretion to choose the procedures for day-
to-day operations.
The Division and local public defenders represent ninety percent of
indigent capital defendants while panel attorneys-attorneys appointed from
the private bar-represent the remaining ten percent. 6 The public defender
and panel attorneys represent indigent capital defendants only when the
Division has a conflict of interest or an exceptionally heavy caseload." The
70. State Execution Rates, supra note 12; see Number of Executions by State Since 1976,
supra note 12.
71. Maryland Offe of Public Defender-Origin and Functions (visited Jan. 18, 2001)
<http://www.mdarcives.state.nid.us/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/6lpubdf.html >.
72. Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, S 3(a) (Supp. 2000) (establishing the OPD as a
subsidiary of the Executive Branch); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, S 9(a), (c) (1997) (establish-
ing a board of trustees a ppointed by the governor to "study and observe the operation" of the
OPD and advise as to the operational matters of the OPD).
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, SS 3(a)-(b) (Supp. 2000); see aso MD. ANN. CODE art.
27A, SS 10(b), (d) (1997) (establishing regional advisory boards made up of judges or attorneys
for the purpose of studying, observing, and advising the district public defender on operations
and appointment of pane attorneys).
74. Maryland Off0ce of Public Defender-Organizational Chart (visited Jan. 18, 2001)< http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/mdmanual/25ind/hunl/61lpubdc.html >.
75. Telephone Interview with Laura Murry, Deputy Attorney, Maryland Capital
Defense Division (Jan. 19, 2001).
76. Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, 5 2(e) (Supp. 2000) (providing the definition of
panel attorney as any attorney licensed in Marylandwho qualifies and is eligible for
appointment as counsel to an indigent person"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, S 6 (b) (1997)
(requiring the district public defender to "appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants
if the OPD does not provide an attorney).
77. Telephone Interview with Linda Murry, supra note 75; see MD. ANN. CODE art.
27A, §5 6(a)-(b) (1997) (requiring each district public defender to maintain a list of private
2001]
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Division also provides many services beyond representing indigent capital
defendants. The Division maintains internal qualifications that panel
attorneys must meet prior to representing indigent capital defendants'and
chooses which panel attorney will represent each defendant. Additionally,
the Division actively monitors the performance of panel attorney to ensure
adequate performance."
' The Division trains the public defenders on defending a capital case in
Maryland and acts as a resource' for all attorneys trying capital cases."
Maryland does not charge capital murder in an indictment, but upon a
charge of first degree murder, the prosecutor has the discretion whether to
seek the death penalty and must give the defendant notice of intent to seek
the death penalty.8" The Division attorneys have the opportunity to discuss
with the prosecutor alternatives to seeking the death penalty either before
or after notice has been given." The Division employs three attorneys and
has an appropriation for 2001 of $699,497.' This appropriation: provides
adequate funding for the operation of the Division. "
E. Kansas's Death Penalty Defense Unit
Kansas has a population of 2.67 million and has not executed anyone
since 1976." The Kansas Death Penalty Defense Unit ("the Unit") began
operation in 1995 after the Kansas death penalty statute became effective on
July 1, 1994.85 The Unit started as a coordinating office for private attor-
neys paid by the state to defend capital cases. However, the cost, of hiring
attorneys and support staff for each case became prohibitively high.6 The
Unit evolved into an office with salaried attorneys and support staff to
attorneys available to represent indigent persons, classify the attorneys into panels according
to qualifications, and appoint attorneys From the appropriate panel).
78. Telephone Interview with Linda Murry, supra note 75.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, S 412(b) (Supp. 2000) (requiring the State to give
the defendant 30 days notice prior to trial of the intent to seek the death penalty and the
aggravating circumstances upon which it intends to rely).
81. Telephone Interview with Linda Murry, supra note 75.
82. Office of Public Defender-Organizational Structure (visited Jan. 18, 2001)
<http://www.mdarchives statexmd us/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/6lpubd.html#organ>.
83. Telephone Interview with Linda Murry, supra note 75.
84. State Execution Rates, supra note 12.
85. Telephone Interview with Linda Murry, supra note 75; see The Spangenberg
Research Group, supra note 38.
86. Telephone Interview with Patricia A. Scalia, Executive Director, Kansas State Board
of Indigents' Defense Services (an. 30, 2001).
[Vol. 13:2
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defend capital cases. The Board of Indigents' Defense Services ("the Board")
administers the Unit. A board of commissioners appointed by the governor
manages the affairs of the Board and the Unit. The Supreme Court of
Kansas fbrmerly controlled the offices, but now the governor appoints the
individuals to the Board and the Unit retains its autonomy."' The individual
commissioners have the requisite knowledge to manage the Board and the
Unit, but do not micro-manage its operations. s Judges confronted with an
indigent defendant charged with a capital crime must call upon the Unit to
either provide representation or select outside counsel.8 .
The Board governs the representation of indigent capital defendants.'0
Specifically, the Board has broad authority to assign attorneys to represent
indigent capital defendants, establish standards of competency and qualifica-
tions for appointment of counsel in capital cases, and set reasonable compen-
sation for appointed counsel.91 The legislature also mandated that the Board
establish systems in each county and adopt rules and regulations necessary
for the operation of the Board and guidance for appointed counsel.2
The Unit, as developed by the Board, consists of five attorneys in the
appellate division and five attorneys, one investigator, five paralegals and
one secretary in the trial division. " Salaries for attorneys in the unit begin
at $49,000 per year for an entry-level attorney and the Chief Death De-
fender's salary begins at $70,000 per year. The Unit receives a designation
of funds separate from the Board. The 2001 budget for the Unit ,is
$1,357,517, but soon after the director requested the budget from the legisla-
ture, four new capital cases were filed in December of 2000." Each case
costs at least six figures and with the addition of four new capital cases, the
Unit's budget falls short of the amount needed for effective representation."
The Unit also faces a problem of expert witnesses charging extremely high





90. KAN. STAT. ANN. $ 22-4506(d)(1) (Supp. 2000).
91. Id.
92. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-4522 (Supp. 2000).







The Unit selects private attorneys to represent capital defendants if the
Unit has a conflict of interest. The Unit had eight capital cases pending as
of January 2001, and private attorneys are representing defendants in two
of those cases.' 8 Sometimes the Unit employs private attorneys if the
location of the case renders the presence of the Unit's attorneys impractical
or if the Unit needs additional assistance due to a heavy caseload. The Unit
sets the hourly rate paid to private attorneys, approximately one-hundred
dollars per hour." The state has not capped the hourly rate or the total
amount payable to private attorneys when representing an indigent capital
defendant."
The Unit primarily represents indigent capital defendants, but the Unit
also acts as a resource for private attorneys appointed to represent capital
defendants. The Unit and private attorneys must carefully avoid conflicts
of interest particularly in multi-defendant cases."' Private attorneys gener-
ally call the Unit to seek assistance or request motions, but the Unit hopes
to have all the motions available on its website in the near future.02
F. Proposed Structure for the Virginia Capital Defense Unit
The death penalty activity among the aforementioned states differs
significantly. Missouri has executed forty-seven individuals since 1976,
while Maryland and Nebraska have each executed three individuals since
1976.0 Although the states assessed above may have less death penalty
activity than Virginia, the VCDU can implement the positive characteristics
and avoid the mistakes of the various capital trial systems.
As the various state capital trial divisions demonstrate, the responsibili-
,ties of the proposed VCDU should include more than just representation
for indigent capital defendants. The VCDU, in conjunction with the
Virginia Public Defender Commission ("the Commission"), must set and
administer the eligibility qualifications of private attorneys seeking to defend
indigent capital defendants. The VCDU should possess the authority to
maintain the list of qualified private attorneys and select an attorney from
that list to represent a defendant. The VCDU should act as a training center
for capital defenders and offer resources to attorneys outside the unit who






103. Number of Executions By State Since 1976, supra note 12.
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current and accurate records of all stages of the capital cases in Virginia
because no central organization currently fils this need.
The Commission may provide the existing framework on which to
construct the VCDU. The Commission consists of nine individuals ap-
pointed by the Speaker of the House of Delegates upon consultation with
the House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees."° The Speaker must
appoint three judges, three attorneys, and three laypersons to make up the
Commission.05 The Commission appoints a public defender to the individ-
ual offices, employs support staff of local public defender offices, and
expends the budget appropriated by the General Assembly of Virginia."
The Commission and the Virginia State Bar adopt standards for the appoint-
ment of counsel in capital cases, and the Commission maintains the list of
attorneys qualified to represent indigent capital defendants.0 7 Virginia Code
Section 19.2-163.7 requires the circuit court judge to appoint counsel for an
indigent capital defendant from the list of attorneys prepared by the Com-
mission. '  However, another statute permits the judge to appoint an
attorney not on the list if the attorney possesses the qualifications set by the
Commission for indigent capital defense. 0  The Commission currently
plays no role in the court's appointment of capital counsel.1
104. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.1 (Michie 2000) (providing that "Members of the
Commission shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Delegates in consultation
with the Chairmen of the Courts of Justice Committees of the House of Delegates and the
Senate").
105. Id.
106. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-163.2 (Michie 2000) (listing the specific duties of oversight
and appointment of public defenders by the Commission); see H.B. 2580 (Va. 2001) (propos-
ing an amendment to SS 19.2-163.7, 19.2-163.8 directing the Supreme Court of Virginia to
participate in the adoption of standards for capital counsel); seenaso Ross E. Eisenberg, Statute
Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 443 (2001) (discussing H.B. 2580 (Va. 2001)).
107. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-163.8(A)-(B) (Michie 2000) (providing that the Commis-
sion and the Virginia State Bar "shall adopt standards for the appointment of counsel in
capital cases" an the Commission -shall maintain a list.., ofattorneys... who are
qualified" to represent indigent capital defendants).
108. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.7 (hfichie 2000) (charging circuit judges to appoint
counsel for indigent capital defendants from the list established by the Commission).
109. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.8(C) (Michie 2000) (granting the circuit judge
discretion to appoint capital defense counsel not included on the Commission's list of
qualified counsel).
110. Telephone Interview with Overton P. Pollard, Executive Director, Virginia Public
Defender Commission (Feb. 15,2001).
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The rates of compensation for counsel appointed to represent indigent
capital 'defendants vary significantly."' The total amount awarded to
appointed capital counsel ranges from $10,000 to over $100,000.112 The
explanation for the disparity in compensation rates lies in the statute that
gives the trial judge "the sole discretion to fix the amount of compensation
to be paid counsel appointed by the court to defend" a capital case.13 The
statute also gives trial judges discretion to pay expenses incurred by the
attorney if the judge "deems [payment] appropriate under the circumstances
of the case."1 t4
The effectiveness of the proposed VCDU is directly proportionate to
the amount of freedom the unit would have from the direct control of state
government. The General Assembly would commit a mistake by continu-
ing to grant each circuit court judge the discretion as to whom to appoint
to defend a capital case and the rate of compensation given to the appointed
attorney. The Commonwealth should allow the VCDU to fill this role in
order to eliminate inconsistency associated with each circuit appointing
private counsel and individually determining compensation."' Although
many circuit judges in Virginia appoint only the most qualified attorneys,
the pool from which to draw attorneys may be limited in certain jurisdic-
tions. The proposed VCDU should also administer standards of perfor-
mance, discussed below, for counsel representing indigent capital
defendants.""
The attorneys and staff of the VCDU should possess the specialization
required not only to represent capital defendants effectively but also to train
and act as a resource for appointed counsel and public defenders. Efficiency
will result because the attorneys and staff of the proposed VCDU will work
primarily with capital defense law in Virginia and will establish familiarity
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163(2) (Michie 2000).
114. Id.
115. See Stephen B. Bright, Neitber Equal Nor Just. The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 821
(1997) (discussing the problem of the lack of independence of indigent defense programs
'when judges and executives controlprograms which continually provide deficient represen-
tation" it may be said that attorneys appointed only "create an appearance of legitimacy").
"Judges' participation in assigning the cases of indigent defendants to lawyers and in deciding
whether to allow funds for experts and investigators improperly involves the judiciary in the
management of the defense." Id. at 825. "Judges should be fair and impartial, and independ-
ent of both prosecution and defense ... independent boards should operate indigent defense
programs." Id. at 828.
116. See infra Part M for a discussion of capital defense attorney eligibility standards.
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with the common motions and strategies for capital cases. If conflicts of
interest or a heavy caseload prevent the VCDU from representing a defen-
dant, subject to proper screening procedures, the unit may still offer its
expertise and advice to outside counsel. The relationship between outside
attorneys, particularly public defenders and the VCDU, must be structured
to avoid sharing confidential information and thus imputing conflicts of
interest fromthe public defender or private counsel to the VCDU. "7
The Commonwealth should employ the established framework of the
Commission."' The General Assembly of Virginia should establish the
skeletal structure and duties of the VCDU and enable the Commission to
approve a slate of nominees selected by the criminal section of the Virginia
State Bar for the positions of chief attorneys and trustees. The chief attor-
neys and the board members of the VCDU would hire subordinate attor-
neys and support staff.
Virginia should copy the Missouri and Oklahoma models by establish-
ing several offices of the VCDU. First, Virginia's geography demands
several locations in order to reduce the amount of travel required by attor-
neys in the unit. Secondly, multiple offices would eliminate most conflicts
that would disqualify the entire VCDU because each office would maintain
separate files of confidential records of defendants. The General Assembly
should create four offices, as proposed in 1998 when the Virginia State
Crime Commission ("the Crime Commission") considered a central capital
defense unit."9 The locations proposed to the Crime Commission were
Northern Virginia, Tidewater, Central (Richmond), and Western
(Roanoke).' Missouri and Oklahoma demonstrate that multiple offices can
function effectively and the state can feasibly support these offices. Vir-
ginia's larger population and greater death penalty activity should act as an
impetus to form four offices of the VCDU.
The VCDU must also perform the fundamental task of keeping records
of the activity of capital indictments, trials, convictions, and sentences in
Virginia. Most of the various states' capital defense units compile data of
capital cases pending and capital cases adjudicated. Conversely, Virginia
117. See infra Part IV for a discussion concerning potential conflict of interest situations
for the VCDU.
118. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-163.1 (Michie 2000) (providing that the Speaker of the
House of Delegates appoints three judges, three attorneys, and three laymen to comprise the
Commission). The creation of a separate structure for the VCDU may be duplicative.
119. Letter from Overton P. Pollard, Executive Director, Virginia Public Defender
Commission to Honorable William Petty, Virginia State Crime Commission (Sept. 1, 1998)




lacks a consistent method of collecting records of capital case activity in the
Commonwealth. Although the Commission had records of the number of
public defenders who represented indigent capital defendants, nineteen in
fiscal year 1999 and thirteen in fiscal year 2000, the Commission does not
accumulate other records concerning capital cases in Virginia."' The indi-
vidual public defender offices do not customarily track the resolution and
number of capital cases that the office has represented.'2 The Commission
estimated that the Commonwealth charges approximately one hundred
capital murder cases annually.'2
The Virginia Code instructs the Supreme Court of Virginia to maintain
records of all capital murder indictments in the Commonwealth. 24 Upon
inquiry, the Supreme Court of Virginia could not produce more than a
rough estimate of the number of capital murder charges for 1999.125 The
court assembled a document from records of Virginia's circuit courts.' 26
The Supreme Court of Virginia recorded each instance which the clerk of
the circuit court entered "Section 18.2-31. " 12" However, the statistics indi-
cate only one firm conclusion: that on the date listed, the Commonwealth
filed a charge that included a capital count. 128 Once "Section 18.2-31" was
entered by the clerk, the clerk may not have updated the code section if the
capital charge was dropped, if the charge was reduced, if the indictment was
dismissed, or if the jury convicted the defendat of a lesser crime. 129 Some
of the entries listed within the report indicate an "M" for a misdemeanor
charge in the "misdemeanor/felony" column of the report." ° Often the
entry indicates several capital counts charged on the same day for the same
121. Telephone Interview with Overton P. Pollard, supma note 110.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-217.1 (Michie 2000).
125. Telephone Interview with Cyral W. Miller, Department of Judicial Planning,
Supreme Court of Virginia Gan. 30, 2001).
126. Id.; see Capital Cases Concluded in Virginia's Circuit Courts, 1999 (1999) (unpub-
lished document, on file with the Supreme Court of Virginia).
127. Capital Cases Concluded in Virginia's Circuit Courts, 1999, supra note 126; see VA.
CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie 2000) (defining the elements of capital murder).
128. Capital Cases Concluded in Virginia's Circuit Courts, 1999, supra note 126.
129. Telephone Interview with Cyral W. Miller, supra note 125.
130. Capital Cases Concluded in Virginia's Circuit Courts, 1999, supra note 126; see
Telephone Interview with Cyral W. Miller, supra note 125 (explaining that when the court
encountered an entry by the clerk of the circuit court that listed S 18.2-31 and listed that code
section as a misdemeanor, those compiling the information reasoned that the probability of
mistakenly entering the "M" for misdemeanor rather than the * for felony was greater than
the probability of erroneously entering "18.2-31").
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court."' The statistical data does not distinguish whether the Common-
wealth charged one defendant with multiple counts of capital murder or
several defendants with a single count of capital murder."" The VCDU
would receive notice of each indictment because the circuit court would
appoint the unit to defend the case or the unit would select outside counsel
to defend the case. The capital murder information will flow to a central
agency producing accurate .and uniform records.
The Virginia Code also requires the Supreme Court of Virginia to
conduct proportionality review of death sentences imposed."' The statute
provides that for conducting proportionality review of death sentences the
court "may accumulate the records of all capital felony cases tried. 4 The
court has undertaken to accumulate records for proportionality review, but
contrary to statutory language, apparently only accumulates records of
sentences reviewed by the Supreme Court of Virginia."' The Common-
wealth has failed to keep adequate records and the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has neglected its statutorily designated record-keeping. The VCDU
could accumulate records and statistics of Virginia's capital cases and pro-
mote accountability for the fulfillment of statutory record-keeping require-
ments.
The proposed VCDU cannot function on a nominal budget. The
General Assembly needs either adequate funds to sufficiently support the
VCDU or it should not establish the unit at all. If the VCDU begins as a
properly funded entity, the cost to the state may decrease because the
131. Capital Cases Concluded in Virginia's Circuit Courts, 1999, supra note 126.
132. Telephone Interview with Cyral W. Miller, supra note 125.
133. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (Michie 2000).
134. Id.
135. See Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Va. 2000) (stating that for the
purpose of proportionality review the Supreme Court of Virginia compares "all capital
murder cases reviewed by this court").
The precise cases the Supreme Court of Virginia has identified for use in proportional-
ity review appears inconsistent. Compare Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 786
(Va. 2000) (declaring that for conducting proportionality review the Supreme Court of
Virginia compares "records of other capital murder cases, including cases in which a life
sentence has been imposed... reviewed by this court"), with Bailey v. Commonwealth, 529
S.E.2d 570, 580, 586 (Va. 2000) (declaring that for conducting proportionality review the
Supreme Court of Virginia examines "all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court,
including those cases in which a life sentence was imposed" and 'all appeals of [capital
murder] convictions... first reviewed by the Court of Appeals of Virginia") (emphasis
added). The Baik-y decision indicated that the court may consider capital cases reviewed by
the Court of Appeals. In the same decision, the court said it relied on capital cases reviewed
by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Does the court rely only on one set of cases or both? The
Bailey and the jotnson decisions both came down on the same day, April 21, 2000.
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VCDU could more efficiently defend capital cases than the existing system
of appointment of individual attorneys. Salaried public defenders repre-
sented thirteen indigent capital defendants in 2000 and the remaining sev-
enty or so indigent capital defendants obtained representation through
appointed counsel paid at an hourly rate.'36 The cost of compensation for
court-appointed attorneys for capital murder defendants in fiscal years 1997
and 1998 hovered around $1.9 million for each year.
3
As an appointed attorney gains more experience, the repetition makes
the steps easier and the research does not have to begin from square one
with each case. A similar principle applies to the VCDU. The repetition
of cases, research, and motions will streamline the process and lower the
cost to the Commonwealth. For the desired result of efficiency and effi-
cacy, the General Assembly should appropriate funds for salaries that will
attract the best and brightest attorneys, investigators, paralegals, and staff for
the offices.
With this proposed structure and its components, the quality of repre-
sentation will increase for defendants, probably at less expense to the Com-
monwealth compared to paying each appointed attorney and public de-
fender for often repetitive work. Establishing the VCDU within the exist-
ing framework of the Public Defender Commission will reduce administra-
tive costs and burdens of forming the unit. The VCDU may improve the
reputation of Virginia and its government and may have the opportunity to
set the standard for capital trial defense units around the nation.
IIL The Role of Qualifications in the Representation of
Indigent Capital Defendants
Despite the primary role of VCDU as trial defenders, the unit should
take the responsibility for development and administration of qualifications
that guarantee an appointed attorney's adequate performance as an advocate
for indigent capital defendants. Currently, the discussion of elevating the
quality of representation for indigents through minimum attorney qualifica-
tions is popular rhetoric. '8 The thrust of the discussions regarding qualifica-
136. Telephone Interview with Overton P. Pollard, supra note 110.
137. Costs of Court-Appointed Attorneys for Capital Murder Defendants (1998)
(unpublished document, on file with author); seealso Letter from Overton P. Pollard to Hon.
William Petty, supra note 119 (estimating the cost of salaries for four separate capital defense
offices consisting of a total of 12 attorneys, four mitigation specialists, and four support staff
at $816,085).
138. See, e.g., MichaelD. Moore, Tinkering tith the MacbineryofDeath: AnExamination
and Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to DeadtiEligible Defen-
dants, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1617, 1655 (1996) (recognizing the importance of minimum
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tions focuses almost exclusively on an attorney's criminal litigation experi-
ence such as the number of criminal jury trials.' While the emphasis on
qualifications encourages reform of representation for indigent capital
defendants, the standards do not ensure consistent and adequate performance
by the attorney."4 Under Virginia's current qualifications for representing
indigent capital defendants, the requirements may guarantee no more than
experienced incompetence. Virginia's qualifications might equally include
experienced, unqualified attorneys and exclude inexperienced, qualified
attorneys. An attorney must impanel a jury in a capital case before the case
is considered "experience" for the purposes of qualification.' 4 Often the
most effective attorney defending a capital case has managed to remove the
attorney qualifications based upon knowledge and trial skills); Improving Criminal Justice
Systems Through Expanded Strategies and Innoative Collaborations, Re prt of National
Symposium on Indigent Defense, Feb. 1999 (visited Jan. 18, 2001) < http://wwojp.usdoj.
gov/indigentdefense/icjs.pdf > (identifying problems with current indigent defense systems
and advocating a central structure for state indigent defense systems that includes
experienced-based qualifications for attorneys).
139. See Improving Criminal Justice Systems Through Expanded Strategies and Innovative
Collaborations, supra note 138; Standards for the Qualifications of Appointed Counsel in
Capital Cases (une 17, 1999) (unpublished document, on file with the Virginia Public
Defender Commission); NORTH CAROLINA RULES AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES
S 4.9 (2001) (requiring that an attorney appointed to a capital case have five years experience
in the general practice of law and a court find the attorney proficient in criminal practice).
140. See Standards for Qualifications of Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, supra note
139. Virginia's standards require that:
1. Lead counsel must:
a. Be an active member in good standing of the Virginia State Bar or admitted
to practice pro hac vice,
b.Have at least five years of criminal litigation practice within the past seven
years including acting as primary counsel. (efense or prosecution) in at least five
Jury trials involving violent crimes with a maximum penalty of 20 years or
more;
c. Have had, within the pan two years, six hours of specialized training in
cav hitad tigation;
ve at least one of the following:
i. Experience as "lead counsel" in the defense of at least one capital case
within the past five years; or
ii. Experience as co-counsel in the defense of at least two capital cases within
the past seven years; i c
e. Be familiar with the requisite court system indudiggsecically the proce-
dural rules regarding timeliness of fings anc procedua default; and
f. Have demonstrated proficiency and commitment to quality representation.





capital murder charge from the case prior to impaneling the jury. In that
respect, the qualifications may even reward ineffective pre-trial performance.
An analogy may be helpful in identifying the distinction between
experience and performance. Imagine a state system in which state-ap-
pointed dentists provide dental care to indigent patients. The state has set
a minimum number of procedures which the dentist must perform prior to
performance of the difficult and complex artificial tooth implant on an
indigent patient. Once the dentist has completed the required procedures,
the state permits the dentist to now perform the artificial tooth implant. An
indigent patient may leave with more pain after receiving treatment from
the state-appointed dentist, but the state-appointed dentist has completed the
required procedures, though incorrectly, and yet satisfied the state's require-
ments. The state must also consider the fact that the dentist may have
performed the procedures that fulfilled the state's requirements on other
indigent patients assigned to receive services from this dentist. The analogy
roughly demonstrates the gaps in Virginia's current attorney qualificationsystem that focuses on the quantitative years of experience of the attorney
but disregards whether the attorney adequately performed the work that
qualifies as experience.
The following discussion briefly addresses and critiques two states'
qualification systems and the American Bar Association's proposed stan-
dards for the representation of indigent capital defendants. The discussion
assesses Virginia's qualification system and offers a proposal to improve the
effectiveness of qualifications for attorneys which includes the central role
of the VCDU in administering improved standards for attorney perfor-
mance.
A. Indiana's Qualifications for Representation of Capital Defendants
In 1989, the General Assembly of Indiana created the Indiana Public
Defender Commission ("the Commission") to set qualifications for the
appointment and compensation of attorneys who represent capital defen-
dants. 42 In 1992, Indiana codified the standards for appointment of trial and
appellate counsel in capital cases.143 Rule 24 comprehensively regulates the
qualifications of counsel, compensation rates, the number of counsel to be
appointed, and the availability of investigative, expert, and other services
necessary for an adequate defense.1" Additionally, the Commission offers
142. Indiana PublicDefender Council, Death Penalty Facts (visitedJan. 18,2001) <http://
www.ai.org.pdc/dpfacts.htm >.
143. Id.; see IND. R. CIUM. P. 24.
144. See Norman Liefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The
[Vol. 13:2
CAPITAL DEFENSE UNIT
a reimbursement to each prosecuting county for fifty percent of the cost of
defending a capital case, if the county's list of defense counsel given to the
court for appointment complies with the state's qualifications. 4 '
Rule 24 relies on the quantitative experience of the attorney and lacks
a provision for monitoring the appointed attorney's performance. 4 ' Maxi-
mum workload requirements distinguish the Indiana Rule from Virginia's
qualifications, but the standards for assessing the workload of appointed
attorneys fail to provide meaningful guidance to judges at the trial court
level.1" 7 Trial judges must extrapolate the meaning of terms such as the
attorney's ability to give "sufficient attention ... quality representation..
. in accordance with constitutional and professional standards... breach of
professional obligations."" Rule 24 gives concrete numbers to the trial
Indiana Experience and lIts mplications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495,500 (1996) (arguing
that Indiana's reform of its indigent defense system has drastically improved the quality of
representation).
145. Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. SS 33-9-14-4(a) (Michie 1998) (requiring the public
defender commission to certify compliance with guidelines prior to reimbursement for
expenditures of indigent defense to defend a capital case).
146. See IND. R. CRIM. P. 24(B)(1) (requiring that lead counsel have five years litigation
experience, experience in at least five felony jury trials which were tried to completion, prior
experience as Iead or co-counsel in at least one case in which the death penalty was sought,
and completion of at least 12 hours of training regarding capital defense within the past two
years).
147. See IND. R. CRIM. P. 24(B)(3):
(3) Workload of appointed counsel. In the appointment of counsel, the nature
and volume of the workload of appointed counsel must be considered to assure
that counsel can direct sufficient attention to the defense of a case
(a) Attorneys accepting appointments pursuant to this rule provide each
ient withquality representation in accordance with constitutionil and profes-
sional standrds. Appointed counsel shall not accept workloads which, by
reason of their excessive size interfere with the rendering of quality representa-
tion or lead to the breach of professional oblgations.
(b) A judge shall not make an appointment otcounsel in a capital case without
assessing the impact of the ap ointment on the attorney's workload.
(c) Salaried or contractual public defenders may be appointed as trial counsel in
a capital case if.
() the public defender's caseload will not exceed twenty (20) open felony
cases while the capital case is pending in the trial court;
4u) no new cases will be assigned to the public defender within thirty (30)
ciys of the trial setting in the capital case;
iii) none of the public defender s cases will be set for trial within fifteen (15)
-ys of the trial setting in the capital case- and
(iv) compensation is provided as specified in paragraph (C).
IND. R. CRIM. P.24(B)(3); see also Standards for Qualifications of Appointed Counsel in
Capital Cases, supra note 140.
148. Rule 24(B)(3)(a); see supra note 147.
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judge when assessingthe workload of a public defender.' 9 However, even
this tangible count the cases rule may not secure quality performance of the
attorney because adequate time to prepare does not necessarily guarantee
proper performance.
Rule 24(C)(1) provides a minimum $70 per hour fee for appointed
defense counsel.' a Presently, the Supreme Court of Indiana appoints
counsel and the trial judge has discretion over whether to award the $70
minimum hourly fee because the judge may consider rates "representative
of the community."' The discretion given to the judiciary may create a
disincentive to talented attorneys considering appointment.
1. Lessons for the VCDU
The VCDU should consider the attorney's workload as a factor when
selecting counsel, although a specific number may not necessarily produce
effective counsel because the workload in each case varies substantially.
Much of the present difficulty within state indigent representation systems
stems from the formidable workload that produces the poor quality of
representation given to indigents. The VCDU may set a minimum compen-
sation rate for private attorneys selected to represent indigent capital defen-
dans, but the courts should not have the ability to disregard the minimum
rate. The VCDU should develop qualifications beyond quantitative num-
bers of jury trials and years of litigation experience to the attorney's perfor-
mance.
B. North Carolina's Qualifiations for Representation of Capital Defendants
North Carolina adopted rules to govern the appointment of counsel to
represent indigent capital defendants.5 2 Contrary to Indiana's detailed Rule
24, North Carolina has promulgated only one short section of qualifications
to govern appointment in capital cases.' The first subsection requires five
149. Rule 24(B)(3)(c); see supra note 147.
150. IND. R. CluM. P. 24(C)(1).
151. Id.; see also Lefstein, supra note 144, at 503 (discussing the major recommendation
of the Commission that the Supreme Court of Indiana rejected: the proposition that the
Commission maintain the roster of qualified attorneys and judges o-ly appoint from the
Commission's roster).
152. NORTH CAROLINA RULES AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE APPOINTMiENT
OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES S 4.9 (2001).
153. Id. Section 4.9 provides that:
No attorney shall be appointed to represent an indigent capital defendant:
(a) Who does not have a minimum five years' experience in the general practice
otlaw provided that the Court or, where authorized, the public defener, may
in its Siscretion appoint as assistant counsel an attorney who has less experience,
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years of experience in criminal law, but it recognizes that co-counsel may
possess the proper ability despite the lack of the minimum years of experi-
ence." The second subsection requires either the court or the public
defender to find that the appointed attorney has "demonstrated proficiency"
in criminal law."'5 The rules do not articulate the criteria needed to meet the
proficiency standard of the qualifications.156
The standard appropriately directs half of the inquiry to the attorney's
proficiency, but the evaluation of the attorney's ability by the court or the
public defender may vary significantly. North Carolina approaches quality
representation more realistically than Indiana because the quantitative
amount of experience constitutes only a partial requirement, recognizing
that the attorney's "proficiency" demands assessment.5 " However, North
Carolina lacks uniformity in determining the proper application of the
standards because the public defender or the court may assess "proficiency"
according to individualized standards.
1. Lessonsfor the VCDU
The VCDU would do well to recognize the value of North Carolina's
qualifications and create an instrument or assessing proficiency. The unit
should start by either making the experience requirements not absolute,
giving the VCDU the flexibility to choose an extremely qualified attorney
without a large amount of experience, or make absolute experience require-
ments attainable by a large group of criminal attorneys. The chief attorneys
and the board of trustees would assess the proficiency-type qualities of tYe
attorney. The ability of an attorney to make effective pre-trial motions and
closing arguments cannot be quantified, but are intangible characteristics
that must form the basis for an attorney selected to represent indigent
capital defendants.
C. American BarAssociation Standards for Appointment of Counsel in
Capital Cases
The American Bar Association adopted its "Guidelines for the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases" in February of
oWh has not been found by the court or, where authorized, the ublic









1989.' The ABA guidelines provide detailed performance requirements
including investigation minimums, required pre-trial motions, guidelines for
plea negotiations, voir dire, capital sentencing, and steps to preserve claims
of error.' The National Legal Aid and Defender Association standards
served as a model for the present ABA standards.' The Guidelines begin
by requiring minimum experience in criminal litigation and experience as
lead counse in three murder trials, six other jury trials, and either lead
counsel or co-counsel in one death penalty case.'6'
Much of the material in the guidelines looks like a handbook for
attorneys representing indigent capital defendants covering the major aspects
of a capital case. For example, Guideline 11.4.1 lists sources of informationwhich the attorney should investigate.' The guidelines encourage investi-
gation into the indictment, potential witnesses, physical evidence, the crime
scene, and expert witnesses. ' The guidelines describe the information that
the attorney should glean from each source of investigation and how the
source should be usedat trial or sentencing." 4 The guidelines offer instruc-
tion to the attorney concerning plea negotiations content of the negotia-
tions, and the obligations of the defense attorney. 65
The VCDU would require outside attorneys to possess knowledge of
capital procedures and familiarity with criminal investigation. However,
the most effective role of the unit may not include listing the copious duties
which an attorney must complete. Logically, the assessment of the attor-
ney's abilities should take place prior to appointment, thus giving the
defendant and the unit confidence in the attorney's ability. The VCDU will
employ the most experienced and knowledgeable capital defense attorneys
158. Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Report with Recommendations No. 107,from
ABA 1997MidyearMeeting (visited Jan. 8,2001) < http://www.abanet.org/irr/recI07.
html>.
159. AMERICAN BARASSOcATION GUIDELNES FOR THE APPOINTMENTAND PERFOR-
MANGE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guidelines 11.4.1-11.9.1 (1989).
160. Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Report with Recommendations No. 107,from
ABA 1997MidyearMeeting, supra note 158 (adopting standards from the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association (NLADA)); see Standards for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (visited Jan. 9, 2001) < http.www.nlada.org/standards/
death.htm>.
161. AMERiCANBAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINEs FOR THE APPONTMENT AND PERFOR-
MANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 5.1(0)(A)(iii) (1989).
162. Guideline 11.4.1, Subsection (D)(4) provides: "Counsel should make efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities,
including police reports. Where necessary, counsel should pursue such efforts through formal






who have the ability to administer performance standards without a formal
procedure or extensive check list. Additionally, prior to appointment as
lead counsel in a capital case, the attorney from the private bar or the public
defender would have acted as co-counsel with a VCDU attorney in a capital
case.
D. Virginia's Current Qualifications and Suggestions for Reform
The Virginia General Assembly enacted a statute that requires the
Public Defender Commission and the Virginia State Bar to promulgate
minimum standards that an attorney must meet before appointment to
represent an indigent capital defendant. ' The statute gives the Commission
possible criteria for consideration including: 1) license to practice law in
Virginia; 2) general background in criminal litigation; 3) experience in
felony practice at trial and-appeal; 4) experience in death penalty litigation;
5) familiarity with the requisite court system; 6) current training in death
penalty litigation; and 7) proficiency and commitment to quality representa-
tion.1
67
In accordance with the statutory directive, the Commission promul-
gated minimum standards for trial, appellate, and habeas corpus counsel.'"
This article discusses only the qualifications for trial counsel. The qualifica-
tions to act as lead counsel in a capital case in Virginia include five years of
criminal litigation experience, primary counsel in five jury trials involving
a violent crime, capital litigation training and prior experience as either lead
counsel in a death penalty case within the past five years or co-counsel in
two capital cases within the past seven years.' For a capital case to fulfill
the Commission's prerequisites of experience as lead counsel or co-counsel
in a capital trial, the attorney must have at least impaneled the jury in the
capital case.'" Subsection (f) of the qualifications provides that the attorney
must have "demonstrated proficiency and commitment to quality represen-
tation." ' Unfortunately, the Commission's qualifications do not offer
definitions of "proficiency" or "commitment" or a means of assessing these
aspects of an appointed attorney."n The Commission strongly encourages
166. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.8 (Michie 2000) (stating that the Commission and
the Virginia State Bar shall adopt standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases").
167. 5 19.2-163.8(A).
168. Standards for the Qualifications of Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, supra note
139.
169. Id.
170. Id. (providing that "whenever the term 'capital case' is used, it shall mean a case in





appointment of two attorneys for a capital case, and if a public defender is
appointed the second attorney should come from the private bar."'
The Virginia General Assembly and the Commission have taken
substantial steps toward providing quality representation for indigent capital
defendants. The question of whether the qualifications promulgated by the
Commission ensure the "proficiency" of the attorney appointed must also
receive consideration. The standards directly address the minimum level of
experience needed by an attorney to qualify to represent an indigent capital
defendant, but no mechanism exists for the assessment of performance of
the attorney at the jury trials, criminal litigation, or capital cases. Virginia's
standards leave open the danger of experienced incompetence.
4
A bill passed by the Virginia General Assembly gives the Supreme
.Court of Virginia a role in the establishment of qualifications and compila-
tion of the lists from which circuit judges appoint counsel.17 The bill takes
Virginia a step in the wrong direction because the aforementioned assess-
ment of state capital trial systems reveal that proper functioning and the
appearance of legitimacy depend upon the independence from the state
judiciary. 176 The other portion of the bill includes a requirement that the
attorney have training In forensic and DNA evidence."' The General
173. Id.
174. See Telephone Interview with Overton P. Pollard, supra note 110 (noting that a
private attorney or a public defender who qualifies on paper may not have the necessary
'trial savvy," yet the problem persists of attempting to measure this quality).
175. H.B. 2580 (Va. 2001) (amending Code SS 19.2-163.7, 19.2-163.8 directing that the
Supreme Court of Virginia along with the Public Defender Commission "shall adopt
standards for attorneys in Virginia... who are qualified to re present defendants charged with
capital murder or sentenced to death" and establish lists of attorneys eligible for appoint-
ment). As of February 23, 2001, the bill passed the Virginia House of Delegates and the
Virginia Senate, both by a unnious vote, and awaits the signature of the governor. SeeHB
2580 Counsel in Capital Cases (visited Mar. 26, 2001) < http://legl.state.va.us/cgi
bin/legp504.exe?ses-011&typ-bil&val-hb2580>; Ross E. Eisenberg, Statute Note, 13
CAP. DEF. J. 443 (2001) (discussing H.B. 2580 (Va. 2001)).
176. See also supra note 115 and accompanying text. But see Telephone Interview with
Overton P. Pollard, supra note 110 (stating that the Commission would welcome the
assistance of the Supreme Court of Virginia in establishing the qualifications, but some
question may arise as to whether the Supreme Court should be making these determinations).
177. Va. H.B. 2580 (requiring capital representation qualifications to include "current
traininginthe analysis and introduction of forensic evidence, including deoxyribonucleic acid
DNA) testing and the evidence of a DNA profile comparison to prove or disprove the
identity of any persons").
It is worth noting that DNA rarely "proves* the identity of a person's involvement in
a crime, but only establishes probabilities of an individual's DNA matching the DNA found
at a crime scene. See Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of S*entific
Evidence v. DNA, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1995) (discussing that DNA matches "are
really only instances of high statistical probability, the reliability of which depends upon the
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Assembly has incorrectly focused the inquiry upon the attorney's knowl-
edge of scientific testing. The proper inquiry must ask the quality of the
attorney's performance in capital cases. This bill has the potential to ex-
clude considerable numbers of extremely capable attorneys due to their lack
of knowledge about scientific evidence which appears in a small portion of
all capital cases.
The creation of the VCDU will provide an informed administrative
body to assess the competence of trial counsel and effectuate Virginia's
requirement of "demonstrated proficiency and commitment to quality
representation."17 ' The VCDU must incorporate a level of input from the
Virginia State Bar criminal section to assess performance of the attorneys on
the roster because opposing counsel naturally observes the attorney's
performance in the courtroom. The VCDU may make use of very basic
experience standards, but the intangible proficiency of performance inquiry
should guide the decision of which attorneys qualify to represent indigent
capital defendants. The role of the VCDU in establishing a consistent rate
of compensation for attorneys, no longer within the discretion of individual
judges, may attract greater interest from a greater number of skilled attor-
neys and alleviate some of the burden of the need to assess counsel's perfor-
mance.
IV Potential Conflicts of Interest Between Local Public Defender Offices and
the Newly Created VCDU
The current oranization of Virginia's indigent representation utilizes
both local public defender offices and court-ap pointed private a n
The Public Defender Commission presently has twenty offices around the
state.' Under the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, if an attorney
has a conflict of interest that disqualifies the attorney from representing the
client, the firm also faces disqualification. Conflicts of interest commonly
occur for the local public defender: a potential client is assigned to the local
public defender's office and the attorney soon discovers that a witness for
development of comprehensive, well-researched statistical pools").
178. See Standards for the Qualifications of Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, supra
note 139; cf. Louisiana Standards on Indigent Defense, Chapter 7, Part VI, Std. 7-6.1 (unpub-
lished document, on file with The Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board) (providing
a procedure for the trial judge to seek certification from the Board for an attorney who does
not meet all of the experience standards, requiring the judge to include particular facts
familiar to the judge that demonstraie the applicant's "competency and commitment to
handle a capital case").
179. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Sstems in the
United States, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 31, 41 (1995) (assessing the varied approaches
states take to providing counsel to indigents).
180. Telephone Interview with Overton P. Pollard, supra note 110.
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the Commonwealth was represented by the attorney or the attorney's
public defender office in another matter. The VCDU's ability to maintain
independence from public defender offices will prevent vicarious disqualifi-
cation for conflicts of interest.
A. The State of the Law in Virginia
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently adopted the Virginia Rules of
Professiona Conduct ("the Rules") that took effect January 1, 2000. s' The
Rules replaced the V *a Code of Professional Responsibility ("the
Code"). Rule 1.7(a) precludes representation of a client whose interests are
directly adverse to an existing client unless each client consents."' Subsec-
tion (b)of Rule 1.7 precludes representation of a client if the attorney's own
interests or interests of a third party materially limit representation unless
the client consents."3 Rule 1.9 expresses the common conflict of interest
affecting public defender offices. It prevents an attorney from representing
a new client in a matter which would adversely affect the interests of a
former client in a "substantially related matter" unless the former and
present clients consent.' Rule 1.9 includes a conflict between the attor-
181. Dennis W. Donhal, Otwriew, in THE NEW VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT-A COMPARISON WITH THE CODE, (1999); see VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6 S U.
182. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000). Rule 1.7 provides that:
J)A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
rectly idverse to another i i client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect
the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
materaly limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to athird person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1 tfe lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
l'fected, and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultations shall include explana-
tion of the implications of the common representation and the advantages andrisks involvej.
Id.
183. Id.
184. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (2000). Rule 1.9 states:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereaf-
ter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless both the present and former client consent after consultation.
(b a lawyer shall not linowingly represent a person in the same or substantially
related matter in wich a Firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated
had previously represented a client
(13 whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired informition protected by Rules 1.6
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ney's former client and the attorney's former firm's former client."' Rule
1.10 explains that under certain circumstances, the group of attorneys
working in a "firm" with the disqualified attorney may, by virtue of their
positions, also be disqualified from representation." Comment three to
Rule 1.10 provides a definition of firm that includes "[lawyers employed
within the same unit of a legal service, organization, but not necessarily
those employed in separate units."18  The VCDU must remain a separate
unit from public defeider offices in order to avoid imputed disqualification.
The Rules, as adopted in Virginia, changed the definition of "firm"
given in the Code.'" The Code defined "law firm" as a "professional legal
corporation," which is "a corporation, or an association treated as a corpora-
tion, authorized by law to practice law for profit."' The new definition
expressed in the Rules is extremely broad. A firm is a "professional entity,
public or private, organized to deliver leal services, or a legal department
of a corporation or other organization. " R The comment following Rule
1.10 further explains the evidence of a firm to be any formal agreement
between the lawyers and the presence of mutual access to information
concerning the clients they serve."1 The determination of whether an entity
constitutes a firm also depends on the particular rule involved and facts of
the situation involved. 92
The VCDU and the public defender offices would have completely
separate facilities and files for confidential client information. The access to
fIles and exchange of confidential information would only take place during
specific cases where the VCDU acted as lead counsel and the public defender
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless both the present and former
client consent after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present
or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:(1) use information relatig to or gained in the course of the representation to
the disadvantage of the former ciem except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would
permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become
generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule
3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
Id.
185. Id.
186. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (2000) (precludin attorneys
associated in a firm from representing a client when one of them would be prohited from
representing the client if practicing alone).
187. Rule 1.10 cnt. 3.
188. See VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble, Rule 1.10 cmt.1 (2000).
189. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY Preamble (1983).
190. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (2000).
191. Rule 1.10 cmt.1.
192. Rule 1.10 cmt.3.
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acted as co-counsel in the same capital case. This would certainly not allow
access to all client files of the other entity. The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia in Lux v. Commonwealth3 held that even within the same office, a
screen sufficiently protects the interests of the client and the confidentiality
of the information.'" Therefore, the proposed VCDU should erect proper
screens to avoid general imputed disqualification due to contact with local
* public defender offices.
In Lux, the Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed whether an entire
Commonwealth's Attorney's office was disqualified from prosecuting a
defendant because the attorney was previously employed by the public
defender office and had previously counseled the defendant on a related
matter.'" This was a case of first impression in Virginia.1  The court
followed the rule adhered to by the majority of states." "The majority of'urisdictions do not per se disqualify the entire prosecutor's office solely
ecause one member of the staff had represented the defendant in a related
matter."' The court adopted the rule that in event of a conflict, the prose-
cutors not directly disqualified may prosecute the case if the disqualified
attorney will not participate in the prosecution of his former client."
The disqualification of an entire Commonwealth's Attorney's office is
within the discretion of the trial court, but the Court of Appeals of Virgini'a
offered some guidance to trial courts.2'o The court established a burden
shifting procedure for determining the vicarious disqualification of the
Commonwealth's Attorney's office."' The initial burden of vicarious
disqualification rests upon the defendant to prove that an attorney in the
Commonwealth's Attorney's office offered counsel on a matter related to
193. 484 S.E.2d 145 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
194. Lux v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 145, 150-51 (Va. Ct. App. 1997 (holding that
the prosecutor's office was not disqualified when a single attorney has a conflict of interest
if the attorney is screened from giving or receiving information concerning the case causing
the conflict).
195. Id. at 150.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also State v. Pennington, 851 P.2d 494,498 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (listing the
jurisdictions that have not applied per se disqualification to prosecutor's staff because one
attorney was disqualified and rejecting the per se rule of disqualification).
199. Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 150-51. It is important to clarify the term "screened" that the
court uses and this article will continue to reference. The court defines screening as prevent-
ing contact between the attorneys handling the matter and the disqualified attorney. Id. at
151.




the prosecution pending against him."2 If the defendant successfully carries
that burden, a presumption arises that the disqualified attorney shared
confidences with the other employees of the Commonwealth's Attorney's
office.' ° It is the Commonwealth's burden to rebut the presumption by
proving that the disqualified attorney "has been effectively screened from
contact with the Commonwealth's Attorneys working on the defendant's
case."2"' The court in Lux held that the Commonwealth's Attorney's office
failed to meet its burden'of proving that the disqualified attorney erected a
sufficient screen between himself and the attorney handling the case.205
202. Id.; see also VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a), (b) (2000)
(precluding an attorney from representing a client if the attorney has previously represented
a. separate client on a "substantially related matter" unless the clients consent to representa-
tIon).
203. Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 152.
204. Id.; see also C.Randolph Sullivan, Note, Building Chinese Walls in Virginia: Should
Virginia Recognize the Chinese Wall Defense to Vwarious Disqualification?, 26 U. RICH. L.
REV. 391, 407-08 (1992) (discussing the definition and components of a chinese wall and
advocating its use in Virginia).
It is important to note that the term 'screened" or "screening procedures" used in the
court's opinion in Lux v. Commonwealth, and used in ethics opinions is synonymous with
the term 'chinese wall." Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 152 n.4. "A Chinese wall is essentially a screening
mechanism set up within an institution to act as an 'impermeable barrier to intrafirm
exchange of confidential information.'" Sullivan, supra, at 392 (citing Note, The Chinese Wall
Defense toLaw-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677,678 (1980)). Imputed disqualifi-
cation arose because it was presumed that the confidences of one attorney concerning a client
were shared freely with the other members of the firm. Sullivan, supra at 393. Therefore,
the screen "overcomes the presumption of shared confidences" and the court does not
automatically disqualify the firm. Id.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11 addresses the concern of an
attorney entering private practice after practicing as a government attorney, and allows the
disqualified attorney to use a screen to avoid vicarious disqualification. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (2000). Virginia accepted the screen defense when it
adopted the ABA Rule 1.11. See VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(b)(1)
(2000) (permitting a firm to represent a client whose interests are adverse to an attorney in
the firm due to the attorney's substantial and personal participation in the matter as a
government employee, if screened from participation in the matter and receipt of fees
therefrom).
The key elements in a screen to prohibit the flow of client confidences and prevent
vicarious disqualification are as follows: (1) the wall must be erected as soon as the conflict
of interest is discovered; (2) the screened lawyer must not be allowed to discuss the sensitive
matter with those in his new firm; (3) the screened lawyer must be strictly denied access to
the documents and fides related to representation; (4) if possible, the screened attorney should
be physically separated from those working on the sensitive matter and should use different
support personnel; (5) the former client or its counsel should be notified so that it can
monitor the effectiveness of the wall. Sullivan, supra, at 407-09.
205. Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 152. The court also noted that if affidavits from the disqualified
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The Lux court disapproved of the standard under the Code for imputed
disqualification based on appearance of impropriety."M Disciplinary Rule
9-101 of the Code admonished attorneys to 'avoid even the appearance of
impropriety."207 The court's disapproval of the appearance ofinpropriety
standard foreshadowed Comment five to Rule 1.9.20 The Comment criti-
cized and dismissed the use of "appearance of impropriety" as an unwork-
able standard and instead implemented a two- part functional analysis for
disqualifications based on a conflict of interest between a former client and
a present client: whether the firm can preserve confidentiality for the
former and present client and avoid positions adverse to a client . ' The
transition to a pragmatic standard for disqualification may make the estab-
lishment of VCDU more feasible than under the former rubric of appear-
ance of impropriety.
The Lux court and the Court of Appeals of New Mexico decision cited
in Lux, expressed a distinction between a prosecutor's office and a private
law firm.2 The distinction rested on the fact of the duty of the prosecutor
to seek justice rather than profits as one would in a ,private law firm."'
Similarly, the VCDU and the public defender lack financial incentives and
have a duty to ensure the proper processes of the legal system,212 thus
suggesting that the VCDU and the public defender may properly screen
attorney and the attorney handling the case had been filed, it would have sufficiently rebutted
the presumption of shared confidences. Id.; see also State c rel. Tyler v. MacQueen, 447
S.E.2d 289, 292-93 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that the filing of affidavits by the prosecuting
attorney and the disqualified attorney is sufficient evidence of proper screening procedures).
206. Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 151 (finding that the appearance of impropriety standard is
laudable but is not the constitutionally required standard of due process). The court found
that a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a
Commonwealth's Attorney's office and is not effectively screened from contact with the
Commonwealth's attorneys who are handling the defendant's case on a related matter." Id.
The court's approach to conflicts of interest and imputed disqualification directly contra-
dicted Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1020 Gan. 21, 1988), and the court cited the opinion with
disapproval. Id.
207. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1983).
208. VA. RULES OF PROFESONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. 5 (2000) (rejecting the
appearance of impropriety standard present in the Code).
209. Id.
210. See Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 151; State v. Pennington, 851 P.2d 494, 498 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993).
211. See Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 151; seePennington, 851 P.2d at 498 (permitting reliance upon
a screen because "[a] prosecutor's sole duty is to do justice" and has "no financial incentive
to obtain prohibited information").
212. See Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Va. 2000) (requiring defense




confidential documents and information to prevent imputed conflicts of
interest.
B. Effect of Imputed Disqualification on the Proposed Virginia
Capital Defense Unit
Application of the court's decision in Lux to the context of the estab-
lishment of a VCDU and its contact with the local public defender office
teaches that the progression toward flexibility in legal ethics may enable the
VCDU to engage in a broad range of responsibilities. Courts have shown
increased willingness to allow representation by attorneys in the same office
as a disqualified attorney, especially by government employees serving the
public. The effect of a harsh per se rule would certainly impede communi-
cation, particularly between the VCDU and public defender, necessary for
competent representation for indigent capital defendants. A screenin
procedure will sufficiently protect the confidentiality of former clients and
avoid positions adverse to these clients.
In the event that an attorney at the VCDU has a conflict of interest and
a public defender takes a case, the court may permit the unit to erect a
screen and continue to assist the public defender with the capital case. The
more common case may arise of the VCDU acting as lead counsel and a
public defender office acting as co-counsel. Even if these conflicts of interest
disqualified the VCDU, the proposal includes establishing four offices,
thereby creating co-equal offices that may assist a public defender in the
event the other VCDU office is disqualified.
V. Conclusion
Virginia has the opportunity to take a significant step toward solving
the crisis of the inconsistent quality of representation for indigent capital
defendants by establishing the VCDU. The VCDU will ensure that a
capital defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
has meaning promptly at the start of the pre-trial process. The Common-
wealth should create uniformity in the quality of representation by giving
the unit the power to select and compensate outside attorneys and adminis-
ter qualifications for outside counsel in the representation of indigent capital
defendants. The creation of the VCDU will accomplish a mechanism for
the representation of capital defendants that is much more efficient than
appointing separate counsel to each capital case.
The states that have created a separate capital trial unit have demon-
strated that the success and efficiency of the capital trial units rests in the
hands of the state legislature that decides whether to make the unit answer-
able to an entity with loyalties and interests other than providing top-
quality death penalty representation. The VCDU may successfully operate
as a subsidiary of the Public Defender Commission if the criminal section
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of the Virginia State Bar nominates the individuals for the chief attorney
positions within each office and the board of trustees positions of the
VCDU. The nominees would require the approval of the Commission
prior to taking their respective offices. The current trend in Virginia of
oversight of indigent defense by the judiciary must give way to the inde-
pendence necessary to guarantee quality representation of indigent capital
defendants.
The VCDU must redirect the focus of the qualifications from the
experience and knowledge of the attorney toward the abilities and perfor-
mance of the attorney. The intangible factors of quality representation
must be taken into account, and the VCDU will have the expertise and
insight to make the judgments as to an attorney's probable performance in
a capital trial. Prior to appointment as lead counsel in a case, the outside
attorney, whether public defender or private attorney, should have the
opportunity to try a capital case as co-counsel with an attorney from the
VCDU. The VCDU attorneys will observe the other attorney in the capital
trial and offer invaluable training and advice and will be uniquely situated
t6 assess the ability of these attorneys prior to selection as lead counsel.
In a situation in which the VCDU acts as lead counsel and the public
defender as co-counsel on a single case, the attorneys must carefully guard
each office's confidential information. Conflicts of interest imputed from
a public defender to the VCDU or vice versa could quickly destroy the
benefits of a central capital trial unit. However, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia appears willing to permit the functioning of public attorneys to
proceed without hindrance from antiquated per se disqualification rules.
The prop er use of screening procedures will cure most potential vicarious
disqualifications. The existence of four VCDU offices will also alleviate the
concerns that conflicts of interest present to this proposal.
The General Assembly of Virginia must recognize the need to offer
every capital defendant a fair trial regardless of the individual's ability to pay
for an attorney. The VCDU can assure the reliability of the adversary
process upon which a fair trial depends. The Commonwealth cannot allow
the wealth of an individual to determine the quality of representation of
capital defendants. The General Assembly of Virginia must rise to the
challenge and take aggressive action to create the VCDU.
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